<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Pqc on TurboLight Solutions</title><link>https://www.turbolightsolutions.com/tags/pqc/</link><description>Recent content in Pqc on TurboLight Solutions</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.turbolightsolutions.com/tags/pqc/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Composite Signatures: Are They Worth It?</title><link>https://www.turbolightsolutions.com/posts/composite-signatures-are-they-worth-it/</link><pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://www.turbolightsolutions.com/posts/composite-signatures-are-they-worth-it/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-19.html"&gt;draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs&lt;/a&gt;, the draft specification for composite signatures, is in the final stages of standardization at the IETF. A composite signature combines ML-DSA with a traditional signature algorithm such as RSA or ECDSA. The two are presented as a single public key, a single signature, and a single algorithm identifier. A verifier accepts the composite only if both component signatures verify.&lt;/p&gt;&#10;&lt;p&gt;The benefit to this approach is clear: if one component breaks, the other still provides security. But composite signatures are not a drop-in upgrade into existing infrastructure, and they are not a way to keep legacy clients working. This post covers the benefit, dispels a few misconceptions, and outlines the trade-offs, which are significant.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>